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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
On January 4, 2000, Appellant, Melvinisha Br own, 
pleaded guilty to an indictment charging her with one count 
of conspiracy to make false statements to a federally 
licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 373 
(count one of the indictment), and one count of making 
false statements to a federally licensed fir earms dealer, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(a)(1)(A) (count six of the 
indictment). The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced her to five years 
probation, including twelve months of home confinement. 
Brown appeals, arguing that: (1) the court erroneously 
rejected her motion to withdraw her guilty plea; and (2) the 
court erroneously refused to grant a sentence reduction 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2 for her mitigating role in the 
offense. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
Brown and five co-conspirators were char ged with 
purchasing a total of nine firear ms in violation of federal 
statutes. Brown herself allegedly purchased two semi- 
automatic pistols, for which she pleaded guilty. One week 
before sentencing, however, she filed a motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea. She contended that her plea had not been 
knowing and voluntary because it had been based upon 
"inaccurate representations of available evidence." She also 
asserted that she was "legally innocent" because the 
government could not prove that she was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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In Brown's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in 
support of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, she 
alleged that the government had failed to disclose 
information that she characterized as Brady or Giglio 
evidence. Specifically, Brown argued that the government's 
plea agreement with her co-defendant, Curtis Jordan, in 
which the government agreed to withdraw count six of the 
indictment, constituted exculpatory evidence that it was 
compelled to disclose pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972). According to Brown, the 
government agreed to drop count six against Jordan 
because he had an alibi defense that exonerated him on 
that count. She claims that her plea was motivated by the 
belief that Jordan's testimony would be used against her at 
trial. Had she been aware of the undisclosed information, 
she may not have pleaded guilty. 
 
The District Court conducted a hearing to consider 
Brown's motion to withdraw her plea. Special AUSA 
Sweeney testified that she did not recall Jor dan's attorney 
ever discussing whether Jordan had an alibi defense. J.A. 
at 208. She stated, "I recall not hearing the word alibi until 
yesterday [4/19/00] when [defense counsel's] pleading 
called it to my attention." Id. at 209. Instead, according to 
Sweeney, the government decided to drop count six against 
Jordan because Brown had chosen not to testify against 
him. She testified that, "I had never disclosed to Ms. Brown 
or her lawyer an intention to use Mr. Jor dan as a witness, 
so the fact that he was not a witness was not a change in 
circumstance." Id. at 209-10. 
 
The District Court denied Brown's motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea. It held that Brown failed to make a 
"colorable claim of innocence." Moreover , the court held 
that the government's failure to disclose its decision not to 
charge Jordan with count six of the indictment did not 
constitute a Brady or Giglio violation. The court reasoned 
that, given the credible testimony of the pr osecutor and the 
absence of any contrary evidence from the defense, Brown's 
"Jordan alibi theory" was "sheer speculation." Relying upon 
Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186 (3d Cir . 2000), the court held 
that even if Brady was implicated, no violation had 
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occurred because Brown failed to demonstrate "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome of this case." Thus, Brown had failed to 
demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawal of her 
guilty plea. She filed a motion for reconsideration, which 
the District Court rejected after she failed to supplement 
the record. 
 
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Brownfiled a 
motion for a sentencing reduction pursuant toS 3B1.2 of 
the Guidelines. She requested a downwar d adjustment of 
four levels for her minimal participation in the of fense or, at 
the very least, a two level downward adjustment for her 
minor participation. The District Court denied the 
requested adjustment, finding that Br own knew that others 
were involved in a criminal enterprise, knew of its scope, 
and was important to its success. As such, the court 
assigned Brown a total offense level of ten and a criminal 
history category of I. The court sentenced her tofive years 
probation, with the first twelve months to be served in 
home confinement subject to electronic monitoring 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Withdrawal of Plea 
 
Brown first contends that she presented a fair and just 
reason for the withdrawal of her guilty plea. She asserts 
three primary arguments: (1) her plea was neither knowing 
nor voluntary because the guilty plea colloquy was 
misleading and deceptive; (2) the government failed to 
disclose exculpatory Brady information before the entry of 
her plea; and (3) she is legally innocent and can pr evail at 
trial. We review the District Court's denial of Brown's 
motion for withdrawal of her guilty plea for an abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1210 
(3d Cir. 1995). However, to the extent that Brown contends 
that the government failed to disclose Brady information, 
we review the court's legal conclusions de novo and its 
factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Ramos, 
27 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Once accepted, a guilty plea may not automatically be 
withdrawn at the defendant's whim. See United States v. 
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Martinez, 785 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986). Rather, a defendant 
must have a fair and just reason for withdrawing a plea of 
guilty. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e). We look to three factors to 
evaluate a motion to withdraw: (1) whether the defendant 
asserts her innocence; (2) whether the gover nment would 
be prejudiced by the withdrawal; and (3) the strength of the 
defendant's reason to withdraw the plea. United States v. 
Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir . 1989). "A shift in defense 
tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not 
adequate reasons to impose on the gover nment the 
expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has 
already acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty." United 
States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in, United 
States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
We conclude that Brown has failed to pr esent a fair and 
just reason for withdrawing her guilty plea. First, her 
contention that the government misrepr esented its evidence 
and secretly changed its theory of the case during the plea 
colloquy, thus rendering her plea involuntary and 
uninformed, is without merit. Brown ar gues that the 
colloquy was misleading and defective because the Change 
of Plea Memorandum read into the recor d by the 
government differed slightly fr om a previously docketed 
version of the document. A review of the r ecord, however, 
reveals no substantive alterations. In both, the factual basis 
for criminal charges was based upon Br own's confession. 
And, as the District Court found, neither summary of facts 
contains any reference to the gover nment's intention to 
have Jordan testify. 
 
The only discernible difference between the two 
summaries is that the version read into the r ecord specifies 
that Brown herself was the source of the information. This 
does not reflect a change in the gover nment's theory of the 
case. The government had always planned to use Brown's 
confession, which is partially corroborated both by the ATF 
form that she signed when purchasing thefirearms and the 
common scheme of the other straw purchasers. 
 
In addition, there was nothing covert or surr eptitious 
about the changes to the Plea Memorandum. The 
government announced the factual basis for Br own's 
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offense in open court in the presence of Brown and her 
attorney. The District Court then asked Br own if the 
summary was accurate and correct. Brown r eplied that it 
was. Accordingly, we do not believe that the changes made 
during the plea colloquy render Brown's plea of guilty 
unknowing and involuntary, nor do they provide a fair and 
just reason for the withdrawal of her plea. 
 
Brown's second argument in support of her request to 
withdraw her guilty plea fails because the gover nment's 
alleged failure to disclose its decision not to charge Jordan 
with count six of the indictment is neither a Brady nor a 
Giglio violation.1 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 
S.Ct. at 1196-97, the Supreme Court held that"the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." Evidence is favorable to an accused under 
Brady " `if it would tend to exculpate him or reduce the 
penalty . . . .' " Id. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The 
prosecution must also disclose evidence r elevant to the 
credibility of crucial prosecution witnesses. See Giglio, 405 
U.S. at 153, 92 S.Ct. at 766. 
 
Here, Brown has failed to demonstrate that the 
prosecution's dismissal of count six against Jordan 
qualifies under Brady or Giglio. Brown maintains that she 
entered her plea of guilty believing that Jor dan's testimony 
would be used against her at trial. She contends that the 
prosecution dismissed count six because Jor dan had an 
alibi defense. Because her conspiracy charges are "factually 
linked" to Jordan, she argues that the dismissal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We assume for the sake of argument, but do not hold, that Brady may 
require the government to tur n over exculpatory information prior to 
entry of a guilty plea. Compare, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 
249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (Brady applies in guilty plea context), and 
Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (same), 
with Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 360-62 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(suggesting that Brady may not apply). W e find it unnecessary to decide 
this question here because it is apparent that Brown would not be 
entitled to relief even if Brady is applicable in this context. 
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undermines the charges against her . Her argument fails for 
several reasons. 
 
First, Brown has presented no evidence that the 
government intended to use Jordan as a witness. As noted 
above, neither the written, docketed Change of Plea 
Memorandum nor the version read into the r ecord 
contained any indication that Jordan was to testify. 
Additionally, Special AUSA Sweeney stated under oath that 
she never intended to use Jordan as a witness against 
Brown and had never implied anything to the contrary. She 
stated: 
 
       My comments are basically that counsel keeps 
       asserting that she was told, it was her impr ession . . . 
       that Curtis Jordan was going to testify against this 
       defendant, there is nothing anywhere the Government 
       wrote, filed or said to lead a reasonable person to so 
       conclude. 
 
       . . . The Government had no notice of anything that 
       it should have or even could have turned over to Ms. 
       Wescott in terms of Mr. Jor dan, I have never spoken to 
       Mr. Jordan, we never proffer ed Mr. Jordan, he was 
       never questioned about this defendant. So counsel's 
       understanding or impression, I submit, is not 
       something for which the Government is r esponsible. 
 
J.A. at 195-196; see also id. at 204 ("There was never an 
arrangement or even an understanding made that Mr . 
Jordan would testify against anyone."). 
 
Brown failed to refute this testimony during her hearing. 
For example, she failed to allege any specific conversations 
in which the government informed her that Jordan would 
testify against her. Nor did she produce any written 
documentation supporting her position. Instead, she merely 
alleged a general impression or belief that the government 
would use Jordan in its case against her . This assumption 
ignores the fact that the government had a signed, 
Mirandized confession from Brown, as well as ATF forms 
corroborating certain aspects of her confession. Thus, 
Jordan's testimony was not essential to the government's 
case. Brown's lack of evidence coupled with the strength of 
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the government's case absent Jordan's testimony persuade 
us that the District Court did not err. 
 
Second, Brown is unable to prove that the government 
dismissed count six against Jordan because of an alibi 
defense. In support of her position, Brown r elies upon 
Jordan's Nunc Pro Tunc Motion for Appointment of an 
Expert, which was filed well after the date of Br own's plea. 
It asserts that during plea negotiations, the gover nment 
and Jordan had a dispute over the number of counts for 
which he was responsible. It alleges that Jor dan may have 
had an alibi defense and that an investigation was 
necessary before he would enter a plea of guilty or submit 
to a lie detector test. An investigation ensued. The motion 
then states that further plea negotiations led the 
government to drop the disputed count fr om the guilty plea. 
J.A. at 218-19. Therefore, according to Brown, Jordan's 
alibi defense compelled the government to dr op count six of 
the indictment. We disagree with Br own's interpretation. 
 
The motion simply asserts the possibility of an alibi 
defense; however, it does not demonstrate that Jordan had 
an alibi. The mere fact that Jordan maintained that he had 
an alibi does not mean that one existed. Additionally, the 
motion neither states nor implies that the gover nment 
dropped count six because Jordan had an alibi. To the 
contrary, Special AUSA Sweeney testified that the 
government chose not to charge Jor dan with count six of 
the indictment because Brown refused to cooperate and 
testify against him. Sweeney had no recollection of Jordan's 
attorney informing her that he had an alibi defense as to 
count six. See id. at 208-09. As Sweeney testified, Brown 
was the only person who could identify Jordan as being 
with her on the date of the purchase, and "when [she] 
decided to exercise her constitutional right not testify we 
simply had no evidence left, [and] I had no alternative but 
to drop that count" against Jordan. Id. at 202-03. 
Therefore, we agree with the District Court that the "Jordan 
alibi theory" is sheer speculation. 
 
Even if the Jordan plea agreement qualified under Brady, 
we still conclude that there has been no violation. Although 
the duty of disclosure under Brady is closely bound to due 
process guarantees, "the Constitution is not violated every 
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time the government fails or chooses not to disclose 
evidence that might prove helpful to the defense." Smith, 
210 F.3d at 196 (citation omitted). The pr osecution's failure 
to disclose evidence rises to the level of a due pr ocess 
violation "only if the government's evidentiary suppression 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. In 
other words, a Brady violation occurs only if there is "a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the pr oceeding would 
have been different." Id. at 197. Here, in light of Brown's 
confession, the signed ATF Forms that corroborate her 
confession, and Brown's agreement in open court that the 
factual basis for the crimes, as recited by the government, 
was accurate and correct, we conclude that she has not 
undermined our confidence in the outcome of this case. 
 
Finally, Brown's third argument, that she was "legally 
innocent," fails. In assessing a defendant's claim of "legal 
innocence" for purposes of withdrawal of a guilty plea, we 
must first examine whether the defendant has asserted his 
or her factual innocence. See Huff, 873 F.2d at 712 
(rejecting claim of innocence where defendant failed to deny 
that he was at the scene of the crime or that he committed 
the offense). Bald assertions of innocence, however, are 
insufficient to permit a defendant to withdraw her guilty 
plea. See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 
326 (7th Cir. 1998). "Assertions of innocence must be 
buttressed by facts in the record that support a claimed 
defense." Id. (citations omitted). In addition to reasserting 
her innocence, a defendant must "give sufficient reasons to 
explain why contradictory positions were taken before the 
district court and why permission should be given to 
withdraw the guilty plea." United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 
317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Here, Brown asserts that she is "legally innocent" 
because without Jordan's testimony, the gover nment would 
be unable to prove its case against her beyond a reasonable 
doubt. However, Brown neither ar gues nor presents any 
evidence that she did not illegally purchasefirearms or 
conspire to do so. Thus, she has failed to meaningfully 
reassert her innocence or explain her contradictory 
positions taken before the District Court. As such, we find 
no fault with the District Court's analysis. 
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B. Sentencing 
 
Brown next argues that the District Court erred by 
refusing to grant her a downward adjustment pursuant to 
S 3B1.2 for playing a mitigating role in the offense. Brown 
contends that the PSI supports her position; it states that 
she is less culpable than others because she only made one 
purchase. Thus, she argues that the District Court's factual 
finding on this question "had no evidentiary basis." We 
exercise plenary review where the District Court's denial of 
a downward adjustment is based primarily on a legal 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United 
States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 237 (3d Cir. 1998). 
However, where the District Court's decision rests on 
factual determinations, we review for clear error. See id. 
 
Section 3B1.2 affords a reduction in a defendant's offense 
level if the defendant was either a minimal or minor 
participant. It provides: 
 
       Based on the defendant's role in the of fense, decrease 
       the offense level as follows: 
 
       (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any 
       criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 
 
       (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any 
       criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 
 
       In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 
       levels. 
 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINESMANUAL S 3B1.2. The background 
commentary to this provision indicates that its application 
depends on the facts of a particular case. Reduction is 
available for a defendant whose role in the of fense makes 
her substantially less culpable than the average 
participant. See id. at cmt. background. However, the mere 
fact that a defendant was less culpable than his co- 
defendants does not entitle the defendant to "minor 
participant" status as a matter of law. See United States v. 
West, 942 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir . 1991). If this were the 
case, then the least culpable member of any conspiracy 
would be a minor participant, regardless of the extent of 
that member's participation. We reject this approach 
 
                                10 
  
because there are varying degrees of culpability present in 
virtually every criminal conspiracy. 
 
The Guidelines provide some guidance to district courts 
attempting to determine whether a particular defendant 
played a minimal or minor role in an of fense. Application 
Note 1 provides that in order for a defendant's role to be 
considered minimal, she must be among the least culpable 
of those involved in the group conduct. Factors such as a 
defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding of the 
overall enterprise and others' activities ar e evidence of 
minimal role in the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL S 3B1.2 cmt. n. 1. Application Note 3 further 
explains that "a minor participant means any participant 
who is less culpable than most other participants, but 
whose roles could not be described as minimal." Id. at cmt. 
n.3 (emphasis added). 
 
In addition to the Guidelines, our case law r equires that 
we consider a number of other factors for deter mining 
whether a defendant is entitled to a decrease for being a 
minimal or minor participant in a conspiracy. Specifically, 
in United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 
1991), we held that a defendant's eligibility for"minor 
participant" status turned on whether the defendant's 
"involvement, knowledge and culpability" wer e materially 
less than those of other participants. This deter mination 
depends upon the following: (1) the defendant's awar eness 
of the nature and scope of the criminal enterprise; (2) the 
nature of the defendant's relationship to the other 
participants; and (3) the importance of the defendant's 
actions to the success of the venture. Id.  (quoting United 
States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1990)). The 
District Court should consider each of these factors in 
relation to the other participants in the conspiracy. See 
Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 239. 
 
Here, the District Court found that Brown was neither a 
minimal nor a minor participant. Because the District 
Court's determination, that Brown's r ole was not mitigating 
in comparison to the others involved, was primarily factual 
in nature, we review it only for clear err or. The record 
supports the District Court's finding that Br own was aware 
of the nature and scope of the criminal activity. The court 
 
                                11 
  
found that Brown presented the natur e of the scheme to 
her cousin Latasha Green. She explained that Jordan 
promised to pay $100.00 for Green's participation. As a 
result, Green agreed to serve as a straw-purchaser. Brown 
admitted she was present when Jordan collected Green to 
make the straw purchase as well as when she r eturned. 
Brown also admitted hearing Jordan instruct Green to 
report that the guns she had purchased for him had been 
stolen. Thus, Brown initiated Green's r ecruitment and knew 
that the purpose of the scheme was to procur e untraceable 
firearms. 
 
Twelve days later, Brown willingly pur chased firearms for 
Jordan so that she could earn her own $100.00. She knew 
that Jordan intended to take the serial numbers off the gun 
and wanted her to report them as stolen. At the gun store, 
the dealer told Jordan that Brown "had to pick out the 
guns since [she] had the ID." She did so, paid for the 
weapons with money Jordan provided, andfilled out the 
necessary forms. Thus, Brown's ar gument that she had 
limited knowledge of the scope and nature of the conspiracy 
is unpersuasive. 
 
The record also demonstrates that Br own's involvement 
was commensurate with, if not greater than, that of other 
straw purchasers and that she was important to the 
success of the venture. Like three of the four straw 
purchasers involved in the scheme, Brown made a single 
buy for Jordan. Only one of the four made two purchases. 
However, unlike her co-conspirators who mer ely bought 
guns, Brown "acted as an in-between, between a major 
figure in the conspiracy and a cohort or co-equal in the 
conspiracy." J.A. at 322-23. Thus, in this r espect, her 
involvement was more serious than the other pur chasers. 
Moreover, Brown's role was absolutely essential to the 
success of Jordan's scheme. Without the initial purchase of 
the weapons from a gun dealer, Jor dan would not have 
been able to re-sell them on the street. 
 
Accordingly, Brown's claim that she was"the least 
culpable defendant" ignores the obvious: she was 
responsible for the recruitment of Gr een, was essential to 
the acquisition of firearms, and knew that Jordan planned 
to remove the guns' serial numbers, making them 
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untraceable, and have her report them as stolen. In light of 
the above, Brown is at least as culpable as the three other 
women used by Jordan and/or co-defendant Jamal Rice to 
effectuate their scheme. Therefor e, the record amply 
supports the District Court's conclusion that Br own failed 
to demonstrate that she merited a "mitigating r ole" 
adjustment pursuant to Section 3B1.2. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, for all the forgoing reasons, the District 
Court's order and sentence will be affir med. 
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